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The law and the administration of justice should be the primary forces in 
combating the causes and effects of racism. Yet justice systems all too often 
fail in this purpose and instead mirror the prejudices of the society they 
serve. The problem is therefore twofold: it is vital that we work towards 
ensuring that every justice system has procedures and safeguards to prevent 
discrimination, including laws that prohibit and punish discrimination, and 
mechanisms to check and rectify patterns of discrimination. It is also neces-
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sary to ensure that discriminatory mechanisms and practices in the systems 
of the administration of justice themselves are eliminated.      
Sergio Vieira de Mello1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Compared to other rights covered by the civil rights movement, the 
right to be free from disproportionate impact of environmental decision-
making, or environmental justice, is a late comer to the civil rights vocabu-
lary. The movement came to national attention in 1982, after protests 
against the siting of a PCB (polychlorinated biphenyls) landfill in a pre-
dominantly African-American community in Warren County led to hun-
dreds of arrests.2  As a result of the protests, the U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) held an investigation and published a report,3 which in turn 
triggered a comprehensive national study directed by the United Church of 
Christ Commission for Racial Justice (CRJ)4 looking into demographic 
patterns associated with the location of hazardous waste sites.  The study 
concluded that the relationship between race and the location of hazardous 
waste facilities was stronger than any other relationship, including income.5  
A second study conducted by the National Law Journal confirmed the find-
ings of the CRJ study, and also found that the harmful effect of the dispro-
portionate siting was compounded by the differential application of en-
forcement and remediation measures.6 
Environmental justice is considered a civil right, which is violated by 
environmental inequity. Environmental inequity is the actual or potential 
exposure of poor or minority communities to a disproportionate share of 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
1
 Sergio Vieira de Mello, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening Statement to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 62d Sess. (March 21, 2003), 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/BFFF5C61BD1195C5C1256CE00048C2C1?opend
ocument (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).  
 
2
 See, e.g., Audrey Wright, Unequal Protection Under the Environmental Laws: Reviewing the 
Evidence on Environmental Racism and the Inequities of Environmental Legislation, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 
1725, 1728 (1993). 
 
3
 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR 
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES, GAO- RCED-
83-168 (1983), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d48t13/121648.pdf.  
 4 BENJAMIN F. CHAVIS & CHARLES LEE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH 
HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987).   
 5 Id. See also Neil Popovic, Pursuing Environmental Justice with International Human Rights 
and State Constitutions. 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 338, 342 (1996).  
 6 See Popovic, supra note 5, at 343.  
2008] Discrimination by Any Other Name 257 
environmental risk.7  Environmental racism has also been defined as a 
“breach of the human rights norm against discrimination.”8  Since the be-
ginning of the environmental justice movement, the effectiveness of civil 
rights legislation in addressing environmental inequities has been severely 
curtailed.9  Part II of this paper presents a brief history of the development 
of civil rights jurisprudence and its decreasing usefulness in dealing with 
environmental justice issues.  Part III evaluates whether recent case law can 
validate some of the proposed alternative litigation approaches to reliance 
on civil rights legislation in environmental justice cases.  Part IV examines 
the alternative of legislative reform, and Part V discusses international envi-
ronmental laws and whether they can help alleviate some of the problems 
faced by environmental justice plaintiffs in United States courts.  
II.  ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CLAIMS BASED ON  
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION  
The most appropriate jurisprudential framework for claims alleging 
disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards is generally found in 
the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments of the 
Constitution.  Equality jurisprudence created the framework that has been 
used to address inequality and prevent racially discriminatory actions in 
education, voting, housing, and employment contexts. The same framework 
should be appropriate for dealing with environmental racism.10  
Civil rights law has been described as a rights-maximizing approach to 
solving conflicts, as opposed to an interest-balancing approach.11  In the 
rights-maximizing approach of civil rights laws, a finding that a violation of 
a legally recognized right has occurred leads to attempts to vindicate the 
right, regardless of the cost to the wrongdoer or others.  In contrast, envi-
ronmental laws are seen as an “interest-balancing approach to resolving 
 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Rodolfo Mata, Environmental Equity: The Next Generation of Facility Siting Programs, 16 
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1995). See also Melissa A. Hoffer, Closing the Door on Private Enforce-
ment of Title VI and EPA’s Discriminatory Effects Regulations: Strategies for Environmental Justice 
Stakeholders After Sandoval and Gonzaga,  38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 971, 974-75 (2004). 
 8 See Popovic, supra note 5, at 352.   
 
9
 In the early and mid-1990s, many scholars were already expressing doubts about the effective-
ness of Equal Protection and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act in the struggle for environmental justice 
because of the high burden posed by the intent requirement. See Popovic, supra note 5, at 345. 
 
10
 See generally Peter Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimina-
tion. 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 271 (1992).  
 
11
 Tseming Yang, Environmental Justice: Mobilizing for the 21st Century: Balancing Interests 
and Maximizing Results in Environmental Justice, 23 VT. L. REV. 529, 532 (1999). Yang’s use of the 
rights-maximizing versus interest-balancing views is based on Paul Gewirtz’s distinction used in the 
context of school desegregation litigation. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 
585, 588-89 (1983).  
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conflicts.”12  In an interest-balancing context, the decision makers consider 
factors such as economic costs and benefits, technological feasibility, or the 
reasonableness of the measure.13  Under an interest-balancing approach, 
there is always the possibility that another interest may justify the violation 
of the right.14   From the point of view of available remedies, there is a clear 
advantage to the remedies offered under the civil rights approach over 
remedies offered under an interest-balancing approach. However, the intent 
requirement under Equal Protection and Title VI legislation poses huge 
obstacles for those attempting to fight environmental injustice under a civil 
rights approach.  
A.  The Intent Requirement in Equal Protection and Title VI 
By the time environmental justice claims attempted to use equality ju-
risprudence, certain restrictions in the application of the Equal Protection 
Clause had already been put in place, severely limiting plaintiffs’ chances 
of success.  The first significant restriction was created by Washington v. 
Davis,15 where the Supreme Court held that in causes of action alleging 
violation of an Equal Protection Clause, proof of discriminatory intent was 
required. Evidence of discriminatory impact alone, the Court said, without 
proof of discriminatory purpose, is insufficient to establish a violation of 
the Fifth or Fourteenth amendments.  In Washington v. Davis, the plaintiffs 
complained that the use of a test for hiring decisions had a disparate impact 
by race, excluding a disproportionate numbers of minorities from employ-
ment.  The plaintiffs in Washington v. Davis did not state a claim under Title 
VII standards because, at the time the claim was filed, Title VII had not 
been extended to reach government employees.16   
In dicta, however, the Court admitted that under Title VII Congress 
had eliminated the requirement that plaintiffs prove the existence of dis-
criminatory intent when hiring and promotion practices disqualified a dis-
proportionate number of black candidates.17  The Court acknowledged that 
under Title VII it would be necessary for the defendants to actually validate 
the use of the test by demonstrating that it was a valid predictor of job per-
formance, but refused to apply this “rigorous” standard to the Fifth and 
Fourteenth amendment analysis.  The Court arrived at this disposition by 
relying on the principle that, on its own, the disparate impact of state action 
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 Yang, supra note 11, at 532. 
 
13
 Id.  
 
14
 Id. at 539.  
 15 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
 
16
 Id. at 239, n.2.  
 
17
 Id. at 247.  
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did not constitute intentional discrimination.18  The Court resurrected this 
principle from some cases dating back over 100 years relating to jury selec-
tion and the exclusion of minorities from certain final juries.  The Davis 
Court did not see any problems with applying the principle in the context of 
the standardized testing for purposes of employment, despite the obvious 
differences between the process of selecting a specific jury from a jury pool 
and the decision to use a test for purposes of decision-making in hiring.19  
Between the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
difficulties inherent in proving the intent to discriminate, suggesting that 
statistical evidence of disproportionate impact was neither irrelevant nor 
“the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the 
Constitution.”20  Evidence of disparate impact was one of the factors that, 
viewed in the totality of all relevant factors, permitted an inference of in-
vidious discriminatory purpose from circumstantial evidence. The Court 
refused to adopt a per se rule that a law that is “neutral on its face and serv-
ing ends otherwise within the power of the government to pursue, is invalid 
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater 
proportion of one race than of another.”21  Under Washington v. Davis, how-
ever, although disparate impact on its own could not serve as a proxy for 
intent, it could be used as a starting point for an analysis of whether dis-
criminatory intent was present, particularly if the policy could not be justi-
fied as serving other legitimate purposes.  Thus, evidence of disparate im-
pact served to shift the burden to the government. Through the years, how-
ever, this approach has gradually evolved and morphed into something 
quite different from what was suggested in Washington v. Davis.  
A few months after Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court decided 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,22 
a case where a non-profit organization alleged that the Board’s denial of a 
re-zoning to allow for building of low and middle income racially inte-
grated housing was racially motivated.  The Court acknowledged the diffi-
culties associated with establishing discriminatory intent, and supported the 
idea that invidious discriminatory purpose can be inferred when a “clear 
                                                                                                                           
 
18
 Id.  
 
19
 The main difference between choice of a culturally-biased test and bias in jury selection is that 
the jury is selected each time by different individuals, and intent would have to be individually attrib-
uted to each court in each case where a racially-biased jury results.  In contrast, in the biased-test con-
text, there is only one actor, the decision making agency, which chooses to use a test that continuously 
produces biased results each time.  The test is designed by specialists who could, if so required, design a 
test that is not biased.  Thus, the analogy between the jury selection context and the biased test context is 
inapposite.  It would make perfect sense to infer intent to discriminate when an agency chooses to use a 
test knowing that such test has been shown to continuously produce racially-biased results.   
 
20
 426 U.S. at 242. 
 
21
 Id. 
 
22
 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
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pattern, unexplained on grounds other than race” appears even though the 
legislation appears to be “neutral on its face.”23  When no such clear pattern 
exists, “the Court must look to other evidence.”24  
In Arlington Heights, the Court expanded on the factors to be exam-
ined in order to infer discriminatory intent that the Court had alluded to in 
Washington v. Davis.  The Arlington Heights Court suggested a non-
exhaustive list of five factors: the discriminatory impact; the historical 
background of the decision; the specific sequence of events leading to the 
challenged decision; departures from the normal procedure sequence; and 
the legislative or administrative history.  Despite finding that some oppo-
nents to the project who spoke at various Board hearings might have been 
motivated by opposition to minority groups, and that the buffer policy used 
by the village as the main reason for refusing the building permit had not 
been uniformly enforced, the Court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to 
carry their burden of proof.  
In fact, despite the list from Arlington Heights and the admission that 
sometimes the disparate impact is sufficient to establish intent, the current 
burden of proof for showing discriminatory intent could be described as 
requiring a “smoking gun.”  The level of proof required is illustrated by 
Miller v. City of Dallas,25 one of the rare cases where plaintiffs were suc-
cessful in alleging discriminatory intent.  The case was settled for an undis-
closed amount once the court dismissed the defendants’ motion for sum-
mary judgment, finding genuine issues of fact concerning whether the city 
of Dallas intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs.26  In Miller, the 
evidence included a long and documented history that designated the 
neighborhood in question as a “Negro district” in the 1940s, followed by 
the construction of a levee project where the city was aware that it was not 
only excluding minority neighborhoods but the project would increase 
flooding problems in those neighborhoods. In addition to the refusal to pro-
vide adequate flood protection, the city had also refused to enforce laws 
regulating pollution in minority neighborhoods while enforcing the same 
regulations in white neighborhoods. In sum, the Miller decision indicates 
that “[a]bsent a history of racial segregation and documented government 
policy promoting discriminatory practices—both typically rare in environ-
mental justice cases—claims of intentional discrimination will not suc-
ceed.”27  The Court chose to use the Yick Wo28 standard as a threshold. In 
                                                                                                                           
 
23
 Id. at 266. 
 
24
 Id. 
 
25
 Miller v. City of Dallas, No. 3:98-CV-2955-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2341 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 
2002). 
 
26
 See Hoffer, supra note 7, at 980. 
 
27
 Id. at 984. 
 
28
 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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Yick Wo, no Chinese person was granted a license to operate a laundry from 
the permitting agency, while no white person was denied a license, in a 
situation where there was a perfect correlation29 between race and denial of 
a privilege.  There, the court found that the disparate impact alone was an 
indicator of intent.  The Miller Court’s choice of Yick Wo’s perfect correla-
tion standard as the minimum for a showing of discriminatory intent created 
an extremely high, impossible-to-satisfy standard for finding intentional 
discrimination.30  
The intent requirement for equal protection claims is a judicial crea-
tion.31  The Supreme Court’s justification for the intent requirement was 
based neither on the plain language of the Equal Protection Clause, nor on 
legislative intent, nor even on any serious public policy argument.  The 
reasoning behind the intent requirement was based on expediency:32 the 
Court worried that a rule requiring compelling justification for a statute that 
had a discriminatory impact despite being facially neutral might “perhaps 
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and 
licensing statutes that my be more burdensome to the poor and to the aver-
age black than to the more affluent white.” 33   The development of the in-
tent requirement is a clear example of the creation of discriminatory 
mechanisms and practices within the system of the administration of jus-
tice.34 In the case of the dominant interpretations of the intent requirement, 
these discriminatory mechanisms and practices completely undermine stat-
utes proscribing racial discrimination. 
B.  Claims of Disparate Impact Under Section 602 of Title VI 
In light of the continuously growing burden posed by the intent re-
quirement, plaintiffs attempting to enjoin state or federal actions resulting 
in discriminatory environmental impacts turned to § 602 of Title VI. Sec-
tion 602 prohibits funding recipients from action that has a discriminatory 
impact regardless of intent and, until the Supreme Court’s decision in Alex-
ander v. Sandoval,35 was interpreted by courts as creating an implied right 
                                                                                                                           
 
29
 A perfect correlation is one where the two variables correlate one hundred percent of the time, 
as was the case in Yick Wo.  Perfect correlations are rarely or never found in the social world.  
 
30
 Uma Outka, Environmental Injustice and the Problem of the Law, 57 ME. L. REV. 209, 243 
(2005). 
 
31
 Id. at 242.  The language of the Equal Protection Clause does not allocate the “equal protection 
of the laws” based on whether a discernable motive can explain the denial.  Id.  Prior to Washington v. 
Davis, the Supreme Court had ruled that a showing of disproportionate impact could shift the burden to 
the government, to justify the challenged measure.  Id. (citing a Title VII employment discrimination 
case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). 
 
32
 Id. 
 
33
 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. 
 
34
 See Vieira de Mello, supra note 1.  
 
35
 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
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of action. This tradition of implying a right of action under Title VI dates 
from Lau v. Nichols,36 a case involving Chinese children who had been re-
fused English instruction in public schools. In Lau, the court found a viola-
tion of Health, Education and Welfare Department (HEW) regulations that 
stated:  
[D]iscrimination is barred which has that effect even though no pur-
poseful design is present: a recipient “may not . . . utilize criteria or 
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting indi-
viduals to discrimination” or have “the effect of defeating or substan-
tially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of the program 
as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.”37  
Even though there was no evidence of discriminatory intent, the Court 
found for the plaintiff, implying a right of action under § 602.38  If the 
courts continued to rely on the principle used in Lau when examining 
claims brought under environmental regulations created in response to § 
602 of Title VI, plaintiffs would be able to avoid the high burden created by 
the increasingly stricter application-of-intent requirement. 
In the thirty years since the Lau decision, however, the Supreme Court 
has gradually moved away from allowing plaintiffs a right of action under § 
602.  This move culminated with the decision in Alexander v. Sandoval.39 
That decision made official what Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission of City of New York40 hinted at 
twenty years earlier.  Justice O’Connor characterized the Court’s ruling in 
Guardians as in effect overruling Lau’s approval of liability for conduct 
having a discriminatory impact in the absence of a showing of discrimina-
tory intent.41  Justice Marshall, dissenting, noted that although § 601 may be 
read as requiring proof of discriminatory intent in the same measure as the 
Equal Protection Clauses were in Washington v. Davis, it specifically per-
mitted administrative regulations proscribing discriminatory impact, and 
therefore these were valid regulations that created a right of action on their 
own.
42
  In Guardians, such regulations existed, they followed the language 
suggested by the Justice Department, and they prohibited “criteria or meth-
ods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to 
discrimination.”43  The Supreme Court, in denying a right of action under 
                                                                                                                           
 
36
 Lau v. Nicols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
 
37
 Id. at 568. 
 
38
 Id. at 567. 
 
39
 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 
40
 Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
 
41
 Id. at 615.  
 
42
 Id. at 617-18. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 
43
 Id. at 618 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1964)). 
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regulations created under § 602, has ignored its own standards regarding 
deference to reasonable administrative construction of statutes.44  
In Sandoval, a case involving an English-only policy for driver’s li-
censes exams in Alabama, the Court found that § 602 did not include the 
“rights creating” language required for private right of action. For a short 
period after Sandoval, it appeared that plaintiffs interested in pursuing an 
environmental justice claim based on disparate impact could still rely on 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain a right of action.45 Circuit courts were split on the 
issue, with some finding that § 1983 provided such a right of action46 while 
other circuits disagreed.47   
Even in the circuits where the § 1983 approach was successful, how-
ever, the option did not remain available for long. A year after Sandoval, the 
Court’s opinion in Gonzaga University v. Doe48 indicated that § 1983 also 
did not create a right of action to enforce provisions created in response to 
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). Although 
not exactly a ruling on § 602 of Title VI, the Court specifically cited Title 
VI legislation as the kind of regulation affected by the decision,49 thus fore-
closing the alternative of using § 1983 to enforce § 602 regulations.50 
The seemingly insurmountable obstacles posed by the intent require-
ment under Equal Protection Clause and § 601 of Title VI, and the denial of 
a right of action under either section 602 of Title VI or 42 U.S.C. 1983, 
have pushed advocates into a search for alternative options, either through 
litigation or other means.   
                                                                                                                           
 
44
 See David Galalis, Environmental Justice Under Title VI in the Wake of Alexander v. Sandoval: 
Disparate Impact Regulations Still Valid under Chevron, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61 (2004).  Gala-
lis notes that, despite Sandoval, EPA regulations promulgated under § 602 remain valid law standing on 
their own under a Chevron analysis, which the Supreme Court never conducted.  Galalis conducts a two-
step analysis of § 602 under Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S 837 (1984),  and concludes that the language of 
the statute is ambiguous, and the legislative history indicates that “Congress intentionally placed the 
resolution of the scope of Title VI in agency hands, to be determined according to the needs of the 
program administered by each agency.”  Galalis, Environmental Justice, at 95-96.  See also, Hoffer, 
supra note 7, at 997. 
 
45
 See Hoffer, supra note 7, at 992. 
 
46
 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 629 (6th Cir. 2006) (overruling Loschiavo v. 
City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d at 548 (6th Cir. 1994) and holding that the rule from Loschiavo that a federal 
regulation alone may create a right enforceable under §1983 is no longer viable); Powell v. Ridge, 189 
F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999). However, Powell was questioned by later cases based on the Alexander v. 
Sandoval decision. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Lafayette College, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1432, at *32 (D. Pa. 
January 29, 2002) (concluding that, in light of Sandoval, the reasoning that satisfied their test to recog-
nize a private cause of action for discrimination in Powell no longer applies). 
 
47
 See, e.g., Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 
1987).  
 
48
 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
 
49
 Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 284, n.3. 
 
50
 See, e.g., Hoffer, supra note 7, at 998.  
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C.  The Future of Environmental Claims under Civil Rights Legislation 
In theory, the principle that statistical evidence alone may be sufficient 
to establish a discriminatory intent is well established.51 In practice, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has held evidence of disparate impact as sufficient 
to infer discriminatory intent only twice.52 Generally, federal courts have 
inferred discriminatory intent from discriminatory impact data in only three 
cases.
53
  All three of these cases dealt with wrongful misallocation of mu-
nicipal services.54  In all five cases, the government was not able to show 
any rational purpose for the discriminatory impact caused by their action.55  
Cases dealing with the siting of hazardous facilities, or other locally unde-
sirable land uses (LULUs), are different from cases dealing with the alloca-
tion of resources, because the number of existing facilities is not amenable 
to producing the same kind of clear-cut statistical data.56  In addition, siting 
decisions involve more complex, multi-factor decisions.  Additionally, the 
remedy for inadequate allocation of resources is a court order to provide 
equal services, while the remedy for siting decisions involves finding an 
alternative location, merely “push[ing] the problem onto another commu-
nity.”57  
The problem of when evidence of impact can be used as evidence of 
intent might be improved by better statistical data in litigation.58  Data on 
discriminatory impact that better controls for alternative explanations for 
the impact, such as market forces,59 may help change the way courts view 
evidence of impact.  
Another option for litigants is making an argument based on the con-
cept of “aversive racism.”60  Aversive racism refers to the unconscious use 
of racist attitudes acquired early on in life in information processing and 
decision making.61  The aversive racism argument is based on critical race 
                                                                                                                           
 
51
 See, e.g., Bean v. Southwest Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
 
52
 Sean-Patrick Wilson, Fighting the Good Fight: The Role of Environmental Civil Rights Litiga-
tors Going Forward and the Need for a Continuance of the Litigation Tool in the Environmental Justice 
Movement, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 293, 305 (2006). The two cases are Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356 (1886), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).  
 
53
 Id. at 306. The three cases are: Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1986); 
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (11th Cir. 1983); and Baker v. Kissimmee, 645 F. 
Supp. 571, 585-86 (M.D. Fla. 1986).  
 
54
 Id.  
 
55
 Id. at 306-07. 
 
56
 Id. at 309. 
 
57
 Id. at 308. 
 
58
 Id. at 310. 
 
59
 Id.  
 
60
 See Edward Patrick Boyle, It’s Not Easy Bein’ Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environ-
mental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 
937 (1993).  
 
61
 Id. at 939.  See also Barbara Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See:” White Race Consciousness 
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 987-89 (1993).  
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theory; as summarized by Edward Patrick Boyle, it stands for the proposi-
tion that  “unmanifested unconscious racist feelings do not go away when 
rejected; rather, they are reformulated, disguised, and adorned with trap-
pings of logic and reason, in order to survive the scrutiny of the conscious 
mind.”62  The aversive theory argument is supported by empirical data, 
which, to date, strongly supports the idea that no decision is, in fact, racially 
neutral,63 and that a court’s presumption that race-neutrality exists when the 
decision-maker is aware of the disparate impact at the time of the decision 
making is, in and of itself, evidence of aversive racism. In failing to recog-
nize the racism underneath the “facially neutral” decision, the court is en-
gaging in exactly the same denial mechanisms as those used by the deci-
sion-makers. Bringing strong empirical evidence of how racism manifests 
itself in these non-obvious ways at the governmental decision-making level 
may help persuade a court to give more weight to evidence of disparate 
impact.    
III.  ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION APPROACHES TO CIVIL  
RIGHTS BASED LITIGATION  
A.  Deliberate Indifference Theory  
The use of deliberate indifference theory is not truly an alternative to 
litigation under civil rights laws; it is actually a strategy used to overcome 
the extremely high burden of showing discriminatory intent under the Su-
preme Court’s doctrinal approach to the Equal Protection Clause.64  In Geb-
ser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,65  the Supreme Court recog-
nized a “deliberate indifference” standard that makes a federally funded 
entity liable for gender discrimination under Title IX.  Deliberate indiffer-
ence can be found when an official in a federally funded program or activity 
and who has the authority to address the alleged discrimination and institute 
corrective measures, has actual or constructive knowledge of the discrimi-
natory conduct, but fails to respond adequately.66   In a later case, the Court 
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further clarified the doctrine of deliberate indifference by explaining that 
the funding recipient’s liability arises out of its failure to remedy the dis-
criminatory problem when it has control over the discriminatory conduct 
and is on notice of the problem.67   
Some courts have viewed satisfaction of the deliberate indifference 
standard as sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent for claims brought 
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.68  Attempts to use the 
standard under Title VI, however, have proven unsuccessful, both in an 
educational context and in the environmental justice context. In Pryor v. 
NCAA,69 the Third Circuit refused to apply the deliberate indifference the-
ory to a Title VI purposeful discrimination case. In Pryor, plaintiffs op-
posed the NCAA’s adoption of a policy increasing academic requirements 
for freshman athletes’ scholarships, which resulted in disparate impact for 
black student athletes.70  Plaintiffs in Pryor alleged that the NCAA was de-
liberately indifferent to the disparate impact on black students, and that 
indifference, in light of the NCAA’s knowledge of the disparate impact, 
amounted to discriminatory intent under Title VI.71  The Third Circuit dis-
tinguished between the omissions committed in the deliberate indifference 
cases under Title IX and the policy targeted by plaintiffs under Title VI, and 
refused to “conflate” the deliberate indifference test with purposeful dis-
crimination,72 finding the purposeful discrimination requirement from 
Sandoval to be stricter than a showing that the recipient was deliberately 
indifferent to the discriminatory impact of a facially neutral policy.73  
The Third Circuit’s decision in Pryor indicates that deliberate indiffer-
ence can not succeed as an independent theory that can substitute for a 
showing of intentional discrimination under Title VI claims.74  It did not, 
however, rule out the utilization of the theory as “an evidentiary piece of a 
larger puzzle.”75  The court also noted that under Title IX, the theory is gen-
erally used in claims for damages, while Title VI actions in environmental 
justice more often seek injunctive relief.76  
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An attempt to utilize the theory of deliberate indifference as a piece of 
the puzzle to show discriminatory intent in an environmental justice case 
however, has not proven successful. The most recent decision in the South 
Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t. of Enviromental Protection77 case 
is illustrative of the obstacles facing environmental justice plaintiffs in 
post–Sandoval jurisprudence. The case had initially been decided by the 
District Court a few days before Sandoval, where the judge had concluded 
that the “New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) 
and Commissioner Shinn [had] violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act by 
failing to consider the potential adverse, disparate impact of the SLC facil-
ity’s operation on individuals based on their race, color, or national origin, 
as part of the NJDEP’s decision to permit SLC’s proposed facility.”78  Im-
plicit in that initial decision was the idea that plaintiffs had a right of action 
under section 602 of Title VI.  
After the Sandoval decision denying a right of action under section 
602, the case was remanded to the District Court to determine inter alia, 
whether there was evidence of discriminatory intent that could constitute a 
violation of section 601.  The Court followed Pryor in finding that “delib-
erate indifference is not enough to justify relief under Title VI,”79  and also 
in rejecting the notion that the disregard shown by defendants towards 
plaintiffs’ rights might constitute a piece of evidence that in combination 
with other evidence, could support a finding of intentional discrimination. 
Plaintiffs in South Camden had argued that the NJDEP had deliberately 
ignored several indicators of disparate impact that had been specifically 
pointed to the Department; that it had chosen not to implement newer, 
stricter air quality standards despite evidence that the older standards had 
been shown to not provide sufficient protection; and that it had also failed 
to enforce regulations when the permittee violated the conditions of the 
permit.   
The South Camden plaintiffs also showed that the state had just cre-
ated the Advisory Council on Environmental Equity.  The Council was 
charged with establishing “a permanent source of advice and counsel in 
recognition of state and federal concerns that minority and low-income 
populations may be experiencing a greater impact from pollution than other 
communities,” and with "making recommendations to the Commissioner 
for strategies to promote environmental equity in New Jersey and for build-
ing partnerships and trust with [the] many diverse communities within 
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[New Jersey].” 80  Furthermore, the Advisory Council was “to provide assis-
tance during the implementation of [the] Environmental Equity policy and 
thereafter serve as [NJDEP’s] principal advisory resource” for handling 
environmental equity concerns. One result of the establishment of the 
Council was the development of a screening model to test the hypothesis 
that “there was a difference in level of exposures to environmental hazards 
and air pollutants among different ethnic groups in New Jersey.”81 The 
model would allegedly be incorporated into NJDEP’s equity policy. The 
expert who developed the model testified that statewide, minorities had 
more than the average exposure to pollutants than whites. Plaintiffs in South 
Camden also argued that new standards for air quality had been promul-
gated by the EPA in 1999, but were not implemented because they were 
being litigated. However, the existence of the new standards should have 
been considered as putting the DEP on notice that the previous standards 
did not adequately protect the affected population.  
Despite the fact that the plaintiffs in South Camden had evidence of 
the deliberate indifference of the agency towards its own goals of address-
ing environmental equity issues, the Court granted summary judgment to 
defendants.  The court allegedly conducted an analysis under the Arlington 
Heights standards and dismissed each one of the plaintiffs’ arguments by 
finding that “even assuming that plaintiffs’ [arguments] were accurate” each 
one of them individually did not amount to evidence of discriminatory in-
tent.  The court, however, never addressed the question of whether all the 
evidence presented by plaintiffs combined, if accurate, could amount to 
evidence of discriminatory intent.  The decision in South Camden seems to 
indicate that there is no limit to how heavy the burden of proving discrimi-
natory intent can be. In the thirty years since Washington v. Davis’ intent 
requirement, the burden on plaintiffs in the environmental justice context 
has become virtually insurmountable, 82 negating the impact of both the 
Equal Protection Clause and Title VI.  
One post-Sandoval case may have given some hope to proponents of 
deliberate indifference theory as a useful tool in overcoming the intent re-
quirement. In Cooley v. Pennsylvania DEP, the Pennsylvania Environ-
mental Hearing Board denied a motion to dismiss a case alleging a section 
601 violation based on allegations that the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection had failed to investigate whether the project, a 
waste-to-energy facility in Harrisburg, would have a disparate impact, de-
spite being required to conduct such investigation.  The Board’s opinion 
suggested that the issuing of a permit without any investigation as to possi-
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ble disparate impacts may constitute evidence of intentional discrimination 
by the department.83  Unfortunately, the Board later granted summary 
judgment for the defendants based on a procedural issue, without address-
ing the merits of the intentional discrimination claim.84 Although the 
Board’s initial opinion on the case did not mention deliberate indifference, 
the opinion hinted at the possibility of a theory of intentional discrimination 
based on a deliberate failure to follow required procedures intended to pre-
vent disparate impact:  
The allegation that the Department issued the permit without making 
any investigation regarding the Civil Rights Act can be taken, and we 
do so take it for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, as an allegation 
that the Department’s failure to perform the investigation was inten-
tional and that intentional racial discrimination motivated the declina-
tion to perform any investigation. 85 
Neither the plaintiffs nor the Board in the Cooley case mentioned deliberate 
indifference, but the opinion seems to rely on a similar concept as that used 
by proponents of deliberate indifference. 
  Although the Supreme Court’s use of the Arlington Heights factors 
seemed to indicate that discriminatory intent could be proven by circum-
stantial evidence, more recent cases like South Camden III point to the con-
trary.  The Third Circuit’s decision in South Camden as well as the Penn-
sylvania Board’s in Cooley dampen the hopes of success for approaches 
based on circumstantial evidence of intent, such as deliberate indifference, 
in the Title VI environmental justice context.  
B.  Use of State Constitution and Environmental Laws 
1.  NEPA and SEPAs 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)86 does not prohibit ra-
cially disparate impacts per se; the Act requires only the preparation of an 
Environmental Impact Statement for any “major Federal Action signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”87  Because NEPA 
does not impose any substantive requirements regardless of the existence of 
adverse impacts of government action, its ability to reduce disparate im-
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pacts is limited.  Nevertheless, even the strictly procedural requirements of 
NEPA can be useful for communities attempting to prevent the siting of 
hazardous facilities or other major projects that may unfairly increase envi-
ronmental risks for a community.  NEPA contains provisions for public 
participation that can be useful in empowering communities by providing a 
forum for communities to educate the government on the disparate impacts 
that proposed actions may have on the communities.88  Communities can 
use the opportunity for organization and public involvement in decision 
making.89 Specifically in the environmental justice context, the Supreme 
Court’s broad interpretation of “environmental impact” as including health 
impacts caused by changes to the physical environment90 indicates that 
NEPA environmental impact statements should also be required to include 
secondary health effects and other socio-economic impacts at the environ-
mental assessment stage.91 
In addition to NEPA, individual states have their own policy acts (col-
lectively referred to as SEPAs by commentators),92 which may require con-
sideration of a broader scope of impacts than NEPA.  Some SEPAs even go 
as far as requiring consideration of environmental justice issues;93 others 
impose substantive requirements on state or local decision-makers.94  Even 
the most demanding SEPA’s, however, are limited by the fact that they ap-
ply only to state or local action, and not to federal actions resulting in dispa-
rate impact.95  Despite these limitations, SEPAs have been found to be use-
ful for communities struggling against proposed noxious land uses.96 
One important limitation of NEPA’s application in environmental jus-
tice cases is that due to the statute’s language, many actions by the federal 
government are not subject to NEPA’s review procedures.  The permitting 
of hazardous waste facilities, an action that often results in disparate im-
pacts, has been excluded from NEPA requirements because the Eleventh 
Circuit found that the EPA’s process for issuing the permit was a “func-
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tional equivalent” of NEPA review requirements.97  The court ignored sig-
nificant differences between NEPA requirements and the requirements un-
der the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).  Unlike NEPA, 
RCRA requires neither consideration of socio-economic impacts nor con-
sideration of alternatives to issuing the permit.98 Furthermore, RCRA public 
participation requirements are not as extensive as those under NEPA.99 
Similar exemptions on the basis of “functional equivalency” are used when 
the EPA or other government agencies establish environmental standards, 
even though the process by which the environmental standards are created 
is substantially different from an environmental impact statement under 
NEPA.100 
Yet another limitation of NEPA as a tool for environmental justice is 
the fact that when states issue permits pursuant to delegated programs in 
lieu of the EPA under the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, or RCRA, the 
states are exempt from preparing an impact statement under NEPA.101  This 
is often the case with permits for industrial facilities emitting large amounts 
of toxic waste into the communities in which they are sited.102 
Despite these limitations, courts have upheld suits for violations of 
NEPA’s procedural requirements.103  Although the ability to bring suit under 
NEPA may not provide the same clear and ultimate result as litigation under 
a civil rights statute would, the provisions may be used to delay projects 
and constitute a bargaining chip in negotiations with agencies and private 
parties that want to avoid litigation. In the absence of a right of action under 
section 602 of Title VI, without the threat of a suit under NEPA, these agen-
cies and private parties might otherwise lose the incentive to negotiate with 
the communities.104  
Furthermore, public participation provisions can be useful in environ-
mental justice campaigns.105  By providing opportunities for public partici-
pation, environmental statutes create opportunities for community action 
that is not centered on the need for a lawyer. Public hearings in connection 
with the preparation of environmental impact reports present opportunities 
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for a community to educate itself on an issue, with the help of lawyers or 
other technical consultants.106   
2.  Citizen suit provisions 
Because environmental laws are interest-balancing and not rights-
maximizing, the remedies offered under environmental laws do not hold the 
same promise of vindication as civil rights legislation.107   Nevertheless, 
several environmental laws contain citizen suit provisions108 that provide 
avenues for plaintiffs where a private right of action under civil rights law 
has been foreclosed.  These citizen suit provisions may, as mentioned 
above, undermine claims that an agency failed to comply with NEPA re-
quirements under the functional equivalent principle.  
Citizen suit provisions may, on the other hand, provide plaintiffs with 
the ability to delay projects while communities pressure agencies for en-
forcement of their own procedural rules.  These delays and the threat of 
prolonged litigation may, to some extent, provide the same kind of bargain-
ing chip for communities that litigation under civil rights legislation can, 
with the additional advantage that chances of a favorable ruling, although 
small, may still be better than in civil rights litigation.109   
Citizen suit provisions confer “private attorney general” status to citi-
zens
110
 providing authority to either prosecute the regulated entity for viola-
tion of an environmental law requirement or sue the public official for fail-
ure to perform nondiscretionary duties associated with that violation.111 En-
vironmental law citizen suit provisions grant citizens the ability to sue on 
behalf of the community at large and obtain injunctive or declaratory relief. 
In contrast, non-environmental citizen suit provisions usually are actions by 
individuals, and relief is often in the form of damages.112   Citizen suits, 
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because they are often “fueled by the altruism of the citizen enforcer,”113 
suffer from lack of resources.  Depending on the statute at issue, and 
whether the suit is against the violating entity itself or the regulatory agency 
that failed to enforce a nondiscretionary duty, different substantive and pro-
cedural limitations apply.114  
C.  Administrative Suits and Federal Agency Review 
  In addition to reaching for the judiciary, environmental justice plain-
tiffs often have the option of filing administrative complaints, either with 
the EPA or with state environmental protection agencies.115 The EPA did 
virtually nothing to enforce the regulations promulgated by the EPA under 
section 602 of Title VI until the early 1990’s.116  However, after the signing 
of Executive Order 12898117 requiring federal agencies to incorporate envi-
ronmental justice to their missions, and requiring the Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR) to investigate and respond to Title VI complaints.118  Commentators 
have been unanimous in arguing that the EPA’s OCR forum, despite the 
Executive Order’s promise to “make achieving environmental justice part 
of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportion-
ately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its pro-
grams, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income 
populations,”119 does not provide any meaningful relief for complainants in 
Title VI administrative actions.120 
Filing a complaint with the EPA is relatively easy, does not require a 
lawyer, and is free.121  In some cases, the filing of the complaint may serve 
as indication of future protracted litigation and convince a private party to 
relocate despite having obtained a permit.122  When filing a complaint is not 
successful in convincing a private party to withdraw an application for a 
permit, administrative suits or agency reviews provide little relief. The 
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process is not an adversarial one; complainants have no right to participate 
in the investigation, are not allowed to present any evidence, and have no 
right to information on the status of the case.123  Historically, only a small 
percentage of complaints filed are accepted for investigation, and of those, 
an even smaller proportion is actually decided on the merits, with the re-
sults almost always siding with the defendant.124 
  The EPA’s Title VI Draft Revised Guidance125 suffers from several 
debilitating limitations: 
Ultimately, the Guidance sets up a mechanism for EPA to respond to 
specific complaints of disparate impacts connected to a specific per-
mit.  Its understanding of the problem is derived through the lens of 
the permit criteria and limited by the specific permit. . . .  It is an ap-
proach that does not easily accommodate larger contexts of inequities 
and historical discrimination. Yet, perniciously, it effectively allows 
discrimination and inequities to be blamed on such larger patterns of 
historical and societal discrimination while avoiding the tough actions 
that would need to be taken to solve them.126  
These limitations make it unlikely that environmental justice plaintiffs will 
find relief in the process.  
D.  Third Party Beneficiary Rule  
Most jurisdictions have adopted a rule whereby a third party to a con-
tract, who had no obligations under it, can nevertheless enforce it, if the 
contract expresses the parties’ intention that the benefit of the promised 
performance be conferred upon that third party.127 The third party benefici-
ary theory applied to environmental plaintiffs is based on the idea that fed-
eral-state funding agreements are, in the words of Justice Scalia “in the 
nature of a contract.”128  To qualify for federal assistance from the EPA, a 
prospective funding recipient (usually a state or local agency) must fill out 
an application and also provide assurances that it will comply with the re-
quirements of government regulations.129   
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Proponents of the third party beneficiary rule as an avenue for envi-
ronmental justice litigators rely on the fact that the EPA regulations clearly 
identify minorities and people of color as the intended beneficiaries of the 
regulation that is made part of the consideration in the agreement between 
the recipient and the EPA.130  Under the doctrine of third party beneficiary, 
the rights of an intended third party beneficiary are “as enforceable as 
though it were a party to the original contract.”131 Parties receiving federal 
funding from the EPA have agreed to comply with EPA’s regulations, in-
cluding those regulations created under section 602 of Title VI prohibiting 
the implementation of programs that have discriminatory effects, even if 
lacking discriminatory intent. Thus, if the regulations are violated, and fa-
cilities are not being sited in locations that avoid discriminatory impact, 
third party beneficiaries of the regulation acquire a legal right to enforce the 
contract.  
Long before Sandoval, Justice Scalia had advocated a categorical re-
fusal to imply federal private rights of action unless Congress had explicitly 
indicated its intent to create such a right.132  Interestingly, it was the same 
Justice Scalia who also expressed a willingness to entertain the possibility 
of a third party beneficiary action in the context of federal-state contracts.133  
Proponents of the use of the third party beneficiary rule in environ-
mental justice cases see advantages for litigators in that under the rule, 
plaintiffs should be entitled to the full range of contract remedies, including 
specific performance or injunctive relief, expectation damages, reliance 
damages, and restitution.134  Writing in 2004, one commentator suggested 
that litigants in cases such as South Camden and Chester135 might have been 
more successful suing as third party beneficiaries of the agreements be-
tween EPA and the permitting agencies.136  
The Federal Circuit in Dewakuku v. Martinez137 suggests how a court 
might answer the question whether anyone can be a third party beneficiary 
of an agreement between a government agency and another party that is 
entered to pursuant to a statute. In Dewakuku, a Native American woman 
bought a house built by the Hopi Indian Housing Authority, an agency cre-
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ated by the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the Indian 
Housing Act of 1988.138  HUD never contested that Dewakuku’s house was 
not “decent, safe and sanitary” as required by the Housing Act,139 but argued 
that Dewakuku had no right of action against HUD. One of Dewakuku’s 
arguments in support of a right of action against HUD was that she was a 
third party beneficiary of the Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) be-
tween HUD and the Hopi Indian Housing Authority (IHA).140  Although not 
exactly an environmental justice case, the case provides insight into how a 
court might analyze similar cases in environmental law.  
The Federal Circuit looked at whether the contract reflected an ex-
pressly stated or an implicit intent by the parties to benefit a third party.141   
The court examined the language of the ACC and concluded that it did in-
dicate the parties to the contract intended to benefit the homeowners.142  
However, the contract also contained language rejecting third party benefi-
ciary rights to the intended beneficiaries of the contract143 and the Court 
rejected Dewakuku’s claim under the third party beneficiary rule.144  
In a typical environmental justice case involving permitting of a haz-
ardous facility, it is improbable that the permit itself (the contract between 
the agency and the facility) will contain any indication of the intended 
beneficiary of the permitting process.  The third party beneficiary rule ap-
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This section of the ACC does appear to express an intent to benefit homebuyers such as Dewakuku 
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CONTRACT RIGHTS CONFERRED,’ and states that ‘nothing in the ACC shall be construed as creat-
ing or justifying any claim against HUD by any third party.’”  Id. 
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 The Federal Circuit, however, remanded the case to the District Court to decide whether Dewa-
kuku had a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), because HUD’s deci-
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been granted under the third party beneficiary rule.  Id. at 1042. 
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plies to the contract itself, so that even if the statute requiring the granting 
of the permit indicates intent to benefit the population, the permit itself 
probably will not.  Thus, although an interesting idea, the theory may not 
provide much help to environmental justice plaintiffs. 
E.  Addressing Residential Segregation  
Residential segregation by race has been shown to be independently 
associated with negative health impacts, regardless of whether the 
neighborhood also suffers from disparate environmental impacts.145 The 
concentration of poverty and political powerlessness increases the probabil-
ity that a community will house LULUs (locally undesirable land uses),146 
because decision-making groups often follow the path of least resistance.  
Thus, the existence of racially segregated neighborhoods increases the 
probability of environmentally racist decisions.  
Unlike Title VI section 602, the federal Fair Housing Act, also known 
as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (FHA), creates private rights of 
action for disparate impact claims.  The FHA made it illegal to discriminate 
in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of race, color, nationality or 
religion.  The federal FHA imposes an obligation on agencies dealing with 
housing to affirmatively further fair housing, including reducing racial resi-
dential segregation.147  Reducing residential segregation could help prevent 
environmental racism merely by preventing minorities from being the ma-
jority in any given area, decreasing the probability of intentionally dis-
criminatory placement of hazardous and undesirable facilities.  Integration 
should also decrease the probability that the community as a whole will 
suffer from political powerlessness, as tends to be the case in racially segre-
gated areas.   
In deciding whether to find a private right of action under FHA, even 
in the absence of evidence of discriminatory intent, courts have found that  
The language of the Fair Housing Act is “broad and inclusive,” subject 
to “generous construction,” and “complaints by private persons are the 
primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act.”  Generally, 
and particularly in a fair housing situation, the existence of a federal 
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 Myron Orfield, Segregation and Environmental Justice, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. TECH. 147, 153 
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 The relevant part of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3604(a)) provides in part that “it shall be 
unlawful . . . to . . . make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.” 
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statutory right implies the existence of all measures necessary and ap-
propriate to protect federal rights and implement federal policies.148  
The 7th Circuit in Arlington Heights argued that although the Supreme 
Court had taken a narrow view of the Equal Protection in Washington v. 
Davis, it had left open the possibility of a right of action under other stat-
utes.149 
The promise of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Arlington Heights, 
however, has not necessarily materialized in other jurisdictions.  It appears 
that courts may be choosing to follow Justice Scalia’s parsimonious ap-
proach to implied rights in Sandoval, despite the Supreme Court’s own ad-
mission in Washington v. Davis that other statutes may permit a right of 
action in the absence of proof of intentional discrimination.  The Supreme 
Court of Connecticut, for example, has followed this narrow approach in a 
recent housing discrimination case pursued under Title VIII:  
An agency’s obligation under 42 U.S.C.S. § 3608(d) affirmatively to 
further the purposes of the fair housing statutes does not create an un-
ambiguous right vested in individual plaintiffs. The statutory language 
is not a directive to benefit the public generally with respect to a spe-
cific right, as in “all persons shall have the right to fair housing,” nor 
is it a prohibition on certain acts against the public, as in “no person 
shall be denied access to fair housing by housing agencies.”  Rather, § 
3608(d) is directed at executive departments and agencies regarding 
the administration of their programs and activities.  This administra-
tive focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual plain-
tiffs and, therefore, does not confer the sort of individual entitlement 
that is enforceable under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983.150 
Furthermore, Title VIII is very specifically tied to housing law and 
claims must be connected to housing concerns.151 Since Title VIII “is de-
signed to work when actual harm can be shown to a particular piece of 
property” making the success of a claim dependent of the existence of a full 
record showing damage to a particular property, the Fair Housing Act can 
not provide the tool that environmental justice advocates need.   
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IV.  LEGISLATIVE REFORM  
Another alternative is legislative reform; Congress could amend civil 
rights statutes and explicitly provide for a private right of action for feder-
ally funded action that is shown to have a racially discriminatory impact, 
regardless of intent.  The inability of civil rights litigation to achieve its 
goal in courts may be a strong indication that Congressional action to in-
clude “rights-creating language”152 in Civil Rights legislation is sorely 
needed.153 The Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the impact of the intent re-
quirement in the context the federal Fair Housing Act underscores the in-
consistency between the denial of a right of action absent proof of intent, 
and the broad goals of civil rights legislation:  
Conduct that has the necessary and foreseeable consequence of per-
petuating segregation can be as deleterious as purposefully discrimina-
tory conduct in frustrating the national commitment “to replace the 
ghettos 'by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.’” . . .  More-
over, a requirement that the plaintiff prove discriminatory intent be-
fore relief can be granted under the statute is often a burden that is im-
possible to satisfy.  “Intent, motive, and purpose are elusive subjective 
concepts,” and attempts to discern the intent of an entity such as a 
municipality are at best problematic.  A strict focus on intent permits 
racial discrimination to go unpunished in the absence of evidence of 
overt bigotry.  As overtly bigoted behavior has become more unfash-
ionable, evidence of intent has become harder to find.  But this does 
not mean that racial discrimination has disappeared.  We cannot agree 
that Congress in enacting the Fair Housing Act intended to permit 
municipalities to systematically deprive minorities of housing oppor-
tunities simply because those municipalities act discreetly.154   
What the Seventh Circuit recognized is that more often than not, the 
impact is the only concrete evidence of intent.  While it is theoretically pos-
sible that a policy or siting decision unintentionally results in disparate im-
pact, in reality there is a very strong probability that the decision contained 
an intentional element that was hidden, or rationalized, under a host of 
technical information.155  There are strong reasons to submerge the dis-
criminatory intent, not the least of them the long-standing constitutional 
proscription of intentional discrimination.  The court’s reaction to the cir-
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cumstantial evidence of intent in South Camden III156 indicates that the cur-
rent standard of proof for discriminatory intent hovers around “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”157  The absence of evidence of discriminatory intent—
other than the impact itself—should not be taken as evidence of the absence 
of such intent.158  Rather, in light of the complexity of the regulatory proc-
ess, and the fact that the “actor” is an institution to which an attribution of 
intent is problematic,159 evidence of impact should be, if not equated with 
intent, at least considered an important factor under consideration. 
The dichotomy between statutes where the language focuses on the in-
dividual, requiring proof of intentional discrimination, and statutes that 
focus on the agency is court-created.  When the Supreme Court decided Lau 
v. Nichols,160 this dichotomy simply did not exist. In Lau, decided pursuant 
to section 602 of Title VI, there was no suggestion that simply because the 
language referred to the agency instead of to the individual, the statute did 
not create an enforceable right.  The Court understood that the statute made 
clear who it was meant to benefit.161 Lau followed traditional canons of 
statutory interpretation, by considering the statute as a whole.  In contrast, 
decisions based on Sandoval look at different sections of the same Act as if 
they were created for totally unrelated purposes.  
If Congress is unwilling to create new rights of action under civil 
rights legislation, it can, alternatively, shift the burden of proof to the 
agency.  The agency is the party who holds the evidence on the decision-
making process. Congress could create a rebuttable presumption that a dis-
criminatory intent was present162 where plaintiffs are able to produce statis-
tical evidence of discriminate impact.163  Shifting the burden does not elimi-
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nate the intent requirement; it merely places the burden on the party con-
trolling the evidence once the moving party brings in evidence of disparate 
impact. A similar problem occurs under environmental laws, where the bur-
den of proving harm is placed on the community opposing the placement of 
a facility, instead of on the polluting actor or permitting agency.164  
V.  INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
The field of environmental human rights law is at the intersection of 
human rights and environmental law.165  Under international human rights 
laws, it is well established that the right to a safe physical environment is a 
fundamental human right in equal footing with other fundamental human 
rights. This principle dates back to the First Principle in the Stockholm Dec-
laration developed at the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment in 1972, which states that 
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate con-
ditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of 
dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect 
and improve the environment for present and future generations.166 
The notion that people have the right to live in an environment that al-
lows them to be healthy and productive was reinforced in 1992 with the Rio 
Declaration,167 and then expanded in the Draft Declaration of Principles on 
Human Rights and the Environment from 1994, which states that: “[a]ll 
persons shall be free from any form of discrimination in regard to actions 
and decisions that affect the environment.”168  
These Declarations drafted in the course of international conferences 
may, however, be considered precatory or aspirational and not imposing 
binding obligations on countries attending the conference.  On the other 
hand, international treaties signed and ratified by the United States ac-
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knowledging environmental rights as fundamental human rights, can be 
seen as imposing certain obligations on the country. Unlike civil rights laws 
in the United States, the language of international human rights laws can 
not be interpreted as being limited to proscribing only intentional discrimi-
nation.169  Under the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),170 for instance, state parties are 
required to “take effective measures to review governmental, national and 
local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws or regulations 
which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination 
wherever it exists.”171  Even clearer is the proscription against “all forms” of 
racial discrimination.  One would be hard pressed to find a justification to 
interpret “all forms of discrimination” as prohibiting only overtly inten-
tional discrimination.  Furthermore, the CERD requires “the provision of an 
impartial forum to address individual claims and provide a responsive rem-
edy when a claim prevails”172 clearly indicating the existence of a private 
right of action.  
The United States has signed and ratified the CERD,173 and Article VI 
of the United States Constitution states that “ . . . Treaties made . . . under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land.”174  Thus, denial of a right of action based on lack of proof of dis-
criminatory intent in environmental justice cases and the refusal to accept 
evidence of discriminatory impact may constitute a violation of interna-
tional obligations under the CERD.  Plaintiffs attempting to state a claim 
under CERD, however, will probably be denied a right of action because 
ratification of the CERD—like that of the two other human rights treaties 
ratified by the United States175—was conditional, subject to “reservations, 
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understandings and declarations”176 that classify the CERD as non-self-
executing.177 Furthermore, these reservations include “forced conformity” 
provisions that restrict the interpretation of key terms in international trea-
ties to their constitutional definition.178 In this way, the United States has 
prevented ratification of international treaties and conventions from impos-
ing any judicial obligations beyond those already provided for in domestic 
law.179  
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the CERD can provide a 
private right of action against state or federal executive agencies. Lower 
courts, however, have agreed that “the United States . . . clarified that the 
ICCPR and the CERD did not create a private right of action enforceable in 
U.S. courts.”180 
Despite the fact that international treaties containing environmental 
rights may not, even after ratification, be enforceable in domestic courts, 
these treaties and the case law created under them in foreign courts may 
still have an impact in environmental justice cases.  The morsel of hope can 
be found in Roper v. Simmons181 where the Supreme Court recognized that 
although not controlling, “the opinion of the world community” can provide 
“respected and significant confirmation” for the court’s conclusion182 that a 
consensus against the juvenile death penalty existed.  In Roper, the Court 
relied on state law provisions or interpretations and state practices to inter-
pret the Eighth amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.183   
Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roper, litigation of envi-
ronmental justice cases in states that have adopted strong SEPAs, particu-
larly those that have attempted to incorporate a substantive element to their 
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environmental statutes184 may help create the kind of “consensus” on envi-
ronmental justice as a fundamental right that a Supreme Court may one day, 
combine with international law and rely upon.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Currently, there are major roadblocks for plaintiffs aiming to prevent 
environmental injustice through civil rights litigation.185 These major diffi-
culties include the obstacles posed by an arbitrary and impossibly high bur-
den of proof for showing intentional discrimination, the Sandoval ban to a 
private right of action under section 602,186 and the denial of a right of ac-
tion to enforce anti-discriminatory legislation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
unless the statute itself explicitly creates the right of action.  There seems to 
be general agreement that Title VI regulations have been effectively 
stripped of both an implied right of action by Sandoval187 and enforceable 
rights under § 1983 in South Camden.188  
More than in other issues such as housing, employment, education, or 
voting, the focus on the intent requirement in environmental justice cases 
has severely undermined the effectiveness of civil rights legislation. The 
decision-making process in environmental cases, such as siting of hazard-
ous facilities, is more complex than decisions in employment or education, 
involving a host of variables such as access to the site and other more tech-
nical factors that increase the deference courts give to agency decision-
makers.  
None of the litigation approaches examined above has met with the 
level of success that civil rights litigation was able to achieve in the courts 
in other contexts.189   Some of the approaches involving more intense grass-
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roots community activism may hold more promise than the more traditional 
“lawyer-centered” approaches.190 Community-based approaches such as 
participatory models and grassroots activism have the additional advantage 
of empowering communities that may have actually been disempowered by 
the need to rely on lawyers and other professionals to litigate their cases.191 
This empowerment and increased participation in public processes may 
impact the community’s ability to deal with other civil rights issues beyond 
the environmental justice context.  It remains to be seen, however, whether 
the removal of the threat of litigation might undermine the power of com-
munity activism, as some commentators suggest.192   
Legislative reform could definitely help environmental justice plain-
tiffs by either changing the standard for a showing of discriminatory intent, 
or by using a burden shifting approach when discriminatory impact is 
shown, as is the case under Title IX legislation, for example.  Barring Con-
gressional action changing legislation, the search for alternative approaches 
to civil rights litigation will continue. 
There are strong arguments for continuing to pursue civil rights litiga-
tion: it has an educational role for the community and others who hear 
about the litigation, it gives the issue media attention, and it can serve as an 
obstructive device that may deter parties from building in places where they 
face strong community objections.193  Although litigation may not appear to 
be cost-effective on a “win-lose” accountability system, there are other ad-
vantages to litigation that may not be so clear-cut.  In many cases, it is the 
“leverage accorded by enhanced access to courts, rather than the actual liti-
gation, that will serve to correct environmental inequities by removing the 
economic and political incentives that drive environmental hazards to these 
communities.”194  Litigation under state environmental laws, particularly in 
states with substantive elements in their SEPAs should be explored as a way 
to build “consensus” over environmental issues.  Finally, the idea of a 
strong attack on the intent requirement using empirical data and forcing a 
questioning of the racist assumptions that permeate the administration of 
justice may be worth exploring.  
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